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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, in the Interest 
of 
MICHA.EL P.A.THICK KELSEY, 
a person under the age of 18 years. 
I Case No. 
~ 10840 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On the 5th day of September, 1962, David L. 
Kelsey was awarded a decree of divorce from his wife, 
Teralee S. Kelsey. There were three children as issue 
from said marriage, to wit: Kelly, age 4.; Michael, age 
3; and Shannon, age 1 year. Custody of the children 
was awarded to their mother, and the father was ordered 
to pay the sum of $120 per month for their support, 
which amount was paid regularly each month. Mrs. 
Kelsey shortly afterwards moved with her children 
from Salt Lake County to Provo in Utah County, 
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where she became mentally and psychologically ill. 
During about December, 1962, a petition was filed 
with the Juvenile Court of Utah County alleging that 
said . minor children were being neglected by their 
mother. A hearing on said petition was held before the 
Juvenile Court on January 7th, 1963, at which time it 
was found, that the mother of the children was afflicted 
with mental and psychological problems which inter-
f erred with her ability to render proper care of her 
children so the court ordered that the children be placed 
with the Ptah County Public Welfare Department 
for foster care. The father of said children was at that 
time unmarried and had no home in which he could 
properly care for his children, so it was arranged for 
him to pay to the Welfare Department the sum of 
$120 per month for their support. The matter was then 
set for review on January 6, 1964. 
During the year of 1963, the father became married 
and established a home in Salt Lake County and re-
quested custody of his children. The Welfare Depart-
ment investigated his home and family conditions and 
found them to be satisfactory so custody of two of the 
children, Kelly and Shannon, were awarded to him on 
a trial basis, under the supervision of the Salt Lake 
County Department of Public Welfare. On January 
13, 1965 a valuation report in depth was requested by 
the Judge of the Salt Lake County Welfare Depart-
ment on the adjustment Kelly and Shannon were mak-
ing in their father's home. The report showed that the 
father was regularly employed and that the home con-
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ditions were satisfactory and the two children were do-
ing well, so the court ruled that the children should 
remain with their father but that "Michael remain in 
foster care because of his own particular needs and the 
desire of the Welfare Department to get Kelly and 
Shannon well settled before returning Michael." 
During this time Leonard Oldham and Pat.5y 
Oldham, his wife, applied to the Utah County Welfare 
Department for the foster care of a boy in their home. 
On May 7, 1963, Michael was placed with them on a 
foster care basis and they received from the department 
regular monthly grants for his care from the money 
being paid to the department by the respondent. The 
Oldhams subsequently moved to the State of California, 
taking Michael with them and on March 28, 1966, filed 
a petition with the Juvenile Court of Utah County for 
leave to adopt said child. The child's natural father, 
the respondent herein, anticipating because of the order 
of the court on January 13, 1965 that Michael would 
join his brother and sister in his home as soon as they 
were settled in it, objected to the granting of the peti-
tion for leave to adopt. A hearing was held thereon. 
The court denied the petition and ordered that Mi-
chael be returned to his father. From that order the 
petitioners appealed. 
The child's natural father is happily married, is 
regularly employed by Buehner Block Company, who 
reports that he is a good workman, is buying a home 
at 439 Front Street, Salt Lake City, is rearing two 
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of his children in his home and is able and desirous 
of having Michael join his brother and sister in his 
home under his custody. 'Vith Michael living in Cali-
fornia with faster parents he is completely cut off 
from all contacts with his family. 
ARGUMENT 
In petitioning for leave to adopt Michael the ap-
pellants are in effect seeking to terminate the right 
of the child's parents to his custody. 
The first contention of respondent is that the statu-
tory requirements for terminating the right of a natural 
parent to custody of his children have not been met 
in the instant case. 
These requirements are summarized as follows: 
a. A hearing must first be held "specifically on the 
question of terminating the rights" of a parent to cus-
tody of his children before custody can be given to an-
other with out the parents' consent. No such hearing 
has been held in the instant case. 
b. A parent must be found to be "an unfit or in-
competent parent" at such a hearing before custody 
can be taken from him against his will. No such finding 
has been made as to respondent in the instant case. 
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REQUIREMENT OF A HEARING 
Section 55-10-109-(2) U.C.A. 1953 as amended, 
specifically provides as follows: 
(2) "A termination of parental rights may be 
ordered only after a hearing is held on the ques-
tion of terminating the rights of the parent or 
parents. A verbatim record of the proceedings 
must be taken and the parties must be advised 
of their right to counsel. No such hearing shall 
be held earlier than ten days after service of 
summons is completed inside or outside of the 
state. The summons must contain a statement 
to the effect that the rights of the parent or par-
ents are proposed to be permanently terminated 
in the proceedings. The statement may be made 
in the summons originally issued in the proceed-
ing or in a separate summons subsequently is-
sued." 
No such hearing has been held before any court 
in the instant case and no such summons for such a 
hearing has been served on respendent. 
The only hearing involving the right of respondent 
to the custody of his son, Michael, was the one on the 
petition of appellants in the Juvenile Court of Utah 
County for Leave to Adopt the child. At that hearing 
no evidence was offered on the fitness or competency 
of respondent to rear his son. In that hearing the court 
rightly denied the Petition for Leave to Adopt and 
entered the following decree: 
1. That Michael Patrick Kelsey is hereby de-
clared to be within the continuing jurisdiction 
of the Court. 
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2. That in the best interest of Michael Patrick 
Kelsey and subject to the continuing juris-
diction of the Court, the care, custody, control 
and guidance of Michael Patrick Kelsey are 
hereby awarded to the father, and the De-
partment of Public Welfare and Leonard and 
Patsy Oldham are he.reby directed to forth-
with return Michael Patrick Kelsey to the 
father under the supervision of the Salt Lake 
County Welfare of Public Welfare. 
3. This matter is set for review on August 21, 
1967 at 2 :00 P.M. Dated this 11th day of 
January, 1967." 
It is the contention of respondent that the juris-
diction of Juvenile Courts over neglected and mistreated 
children is purely a statutory authority and that the 
procedures set up in the statutes must be followed in 
detail in the exercise of such authority by the courts. 
It, therefore, follows that in the absence of a hearing 
in accordance with the provisions of Section 55-10-109-
(2) UCA, 1953, the respondent cannot be deprived of 
custody of his child in the instant case. 
PROOF OF FITNESS OF NATURAL PARENT 
Section 55-10-109-( 1) UCA, 1953, as amended, 
clearly states what must be proved at such a hearing 
before a natural parent can be deprived of custody. 
The court must find that the natural parent is either 
a. Unfit or incompetent "by reason of conduct 
or conditions seriously detrimental to the child, 
or 
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b. That the parent has abandoned his child, or 
c. That the parent has continuously or repeated-
ly refused or failed to give proper parental 
care and protection during a trial period with 
the child in his home on probation. 
Applying these circumstances to the instant case 
we find the following: 
a. Instead of being found to be an unfit or incom-
petent parent, the Welfare Department has repeatedly, 
upon investigation, found respondent to be both fit 
and competent to rear his children. The manner in 
which he and his wife have been rearing two of his 
three children has met with the approval of both the 
Welfare Department and the Juvenile Court. He has 
proved that his home, his wife and the environment 
in his home are good and wholesome. 
b. Respondent has never abondoned his child. He 
has supported all of his children from the time of their 
birth. Since the divorce when the children were awarded 
to their mother, he has made regular payments of $40 
per month to either his former wife or the Welfare 
Department for each child. He has paid to appellants 
through the Juvenile Court the cost of supporting 
Michael during the years he has lived in their home as 
a foster child, and his constantly sought custody of him. 
c. Respondent has never had Michael in his home 
on a trial basis, primarily because the boy has been 
living in California with the appellants. The records 
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show that he has succeeded in the rearing of the brother 
and sister of Michael since he has had custody of them. 
Respondent contends that none of the circum-
stances listed in the statutes as grounds for depriving 
him of custody of his boy exist in the instant case. In-
stead he has proved to the satisfaction of the Juvenile 
Court that he is a fit and competent parent who is able 
and desirous of rearing Michael as well as his other 
children. 
LEGISLATIVE INTENT 
The same legislative act which clothed Juvenile 
Courts of Utah with the authority they now have clearly 
states the legislative intent relating thereto. This is 
stated in Section 55-10-63, UCA, 1953, as follows: 
"Purpose of act - Construction. - It is the pur-
pose of this act to secure for each child coming 
before the juvenile court such care, guidance, 
and control, pref er able in his own home, as will 
serve his welfare and the best interests of the 
state; to preserve and strengthen family ties 
whenever possible; to secure for any child who 
is remoyed from his home the care, guidance, and 
discipline required to assist him to develop into 
a responsible citizen, to improve the conditions 
and home environment responsible for his de-
linquency; and, at the same time, to protect the 
community and its individual citizens against 
juvenile violence and juvenile law breaking. To 
this end this act shall be liberally construed." 
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The meaning seems clear that the legislature in-
tended by enacting this legislation that the juvenile 
courts of the state try to accomplish the purpose of 
the legislation by working with the parents and chil-
dren within their home and to preserve the family 
status if possible, and that children should not be re-
moved from the home or from the custody of their 
parents before it becomes apparent that the welfare 
of the children require such action. 
In the instant case, Michael has been deprived of 
all association with his brother and sister and his par-
ents, and no opportunity has been afforded respondent 
to unite his family and to strengthen the natural ties 
between his children and himself as the statute intended. 
PREFERENTIAL RIGHTS O:F 
NATURAL PARENTS 
It is a well-settled doctrine in this state as well 
as in other states that the natural parent of a child 
has a preferential right of custody. Furthermore, in 
Utah, there is a presumption that it will be to the 
best interest of children for them to be reared by their 
natural parents. On this point the Court stated the fol-
lowing in the case of In re Bradley, (Utah) 167 P 2d 
978.p.984 
"There is a presumption that it will be for 
the best interest of the child to be reared by its 
natural parent, and that presumption is not 
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overcome until the trier of the facts is satisfied 
from the evidence to the contrary. Such pre-
sumption being based on logic and natural in-
ference should be kept in mind by the trier of 
the facts and weighed and considered along with 
the other evidence in determining what is for the 
best interest of the child." 
In re Johnson (Utah), 17 5 P2d 486, the Court 
stated: 
"Throughout the Juvenile Code repeated 
warnings are given as to the preferential rights 
of natural parents." 
"The legal right of the parents, however, 
should never be lost sight of as an influential 
factor or lightly or arbitrarily disregarded, nor 
should their moral, natural and emotional ties 
with the child be overlooked; the law presumes 
that the interest of the child will be best served 
by awarding its custody to the parent, and in the 
absence of conduct on their part or conditions 
that render it essential to the safety and welfare 
of the child in most serious and important re-
spects, either physically, intellectually, or moral-
ly, that it should be removed from their custody, 
the court should always give the custody to them, 
and should ref use to give the custody to third 
persons even though they are in all respects 
suitable to have the custody of the child and able 
to care for it, or even though they are better 
able to afford the child material advantages." 17 
C.J.S. 649 Para. 12. 
In re State (Utah), 175 P2d 486, P 488, 
"Furthermore, this Court has repeatedly recog-
nized that there is a presumption that it will 
be for the best interest of the child to be reared 
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under the care, custody, control and supervision 
of its natural parents. Such presumption is only 
overcome when the trier of the facts is convinced 
by the evidence that the welfare of the child re-
quires that the child be awarded.to someone other 
than the natural parents. Thus the ultimate bur-
den of proof on this question is always in favor 
of t~e natural parents and against other persons 
seekmg custody of such child. In addition there-
to, this presumption is based on logic, and ex-
perience shows generally that parents have more 
love, devotion and regard for their own children 
than do other people. Therefore, this fact has 
evidentiary value which should be considered by 
the trier of the facts in determinig such question." 
Baldwin vs. Nielson, 170 P.2d 179, P. 181. 
"There is a presumption in a contest between 
a parent of the child on the one hand and a 
person who is not the parent of the child on the 
other hand, that it will be to the best interests 
and welfare of the child to be reared under the 
care, custody and control of its natural parents. 
Under such presumption the burden of persuad-
ing the trier of the facts is always on the person 
who claims that it will be for the best interest 
of the child to be reared by someone other than 
the natural parents of said child.'' 
Walton vs. Coffrnan, 169 P.2d 97, P. 103. 
"In addition thereto, this presumption being 
based on logic and natural inferences, should 
be kept in mind by the trier of the f:licts and 
weighed and considered with all of the other 
evidence in determining this question. The com-
mon experience of mankind teaches that "blood 
is thicker than water", that usually there is a 
much stronger attachment between a natural 
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parent and a child than is developed between the 
child and a foster parent, that ordinarily the 
natural parent is willmg to sacrifice its own 
interests and welfare for the benefit of the child 
much more than is the case with foster parents 
and that generally the natural parent is more 
sympathetic and understanding and better able 
to get the confidence and love of its own child 
than anyone else." 
There being no evidence on the fitness of respond-
ent as a parent and no hearing on such an issue, the 
presumption stands that the best interest of Mi-
chael will be served by placing him in the custody of 
his father. 
THE llEST WELFARE OF THE CHILD 
In their brief the appellants contended that Michael 
was placed in a foster home because of the acts of its 
natural parents; therefore, their rights as parents be-
came subordinate to the best interests of the child, and 
their claim for custody of their offspring became in-
effective. If such a theory became the law of the land, 
every parent during periods of temporary illness or 
loss of employment could find himself in a position 
of losing custody of his children. 
In the instant case the children were not placed 
in foster homes because of the acts of either parent. 
The children had been awarded to their mother, who 
was entitled by law to their custody in divorce proceed-
ings. They were taken from her because she became 
mentally and physically ill. The respondent has been 
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trying to get custody of them since then. He has sup-
ported them from the date of the divorce. He has been 
found by the Juvenile Court to be a fit person to have 
custody. He has done nothing to disqualify himself 
under the law from having such custody. The original 
circumstances which resulted in the placement of the 
children in foster care was not due to any misconduct 
of their parents. Instead it was due to the mental and 
physical illness of their mother, who had been awarded 
custody of them in the divorce proceedings, and the 
fact that at that particular time their father was not 
established in a home where he could look out for them. 
At the hearing before the juvenile court on their 
Petition for Leave to Adopt Michael appellants avoid-
ed any evidence relating to the fitness of respondent to 
have custody. Undoubtedly this was because of previous 
findings that he was fit to rear his boy with its brother 
and sister. A reading of the transcript reveals that they 
attempted to prove that appellants were good people, 
were providing Michael with a good home as foster 
parents and were taking good care of him, that they 
and their children loved him and wanted to adopt him, 
that he was being treated as one of the family and not 
as a foster child, and that Michael was happy in their 
home. 
Their witnesses consisted of the appellants, their 
bishop and his wife, their stake president, who was a 
doctor, a friend who was in the U. S. Air Force sta-
tioned in Turkey who had visited with appellants in 
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their home several times. There was a stipulation that 
the children of appellants who were present at the 
hearing would testify that they loved Michael and 
wanted to keep him in their home, if they were called 
to testify. 
It seems significant that the whole family came 
to the hearing from California-all except Michael-
who was really the only one who could have revealed 
the true facts as to whether he was happy in the home 
of appellants, or wanted to be adopted by them instead 
of being permitted to live with his father and brother 
and sister. His absence casts a doubt as to whether he 
is happy in his foster home. 
The evidence showed that both ofthe appellants 
were employed on a full-time basis at a State Mental 
hospital. This fact raises the question as to whether 
any child is better off in a home where both parents are 
working than he would be in a home where the mother 
does not work as is the situation in his natural father's 
home. 
None of the witnesses had close connections with 
appellants' family except the members of the family. 
The bishop stated that he had been in their home two 
or three times. His wife had observed Michael every 
other Tuesday in the school library, where she was a 
voluntary worker, and at church. The stake president, 
who was a physician, had seen him two or three times 
as his doctor. All of the non-members of the family 
apparently based their conclusions on casual observa-
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tions in church and other places. The one person,· Mi-
chael, who could have presented the best evidence as 
to the effects on his life in living with his foster parents 
was not brought forth to testify. 
It was brought out at the hearing that Michael had 
"wet his bed" at nights during the years he had lived 
with appellants. Doctor Van W agonen, one of the ap-
pellants' witnesses, testified that in his opinion this 
was due to emotional background rather than any 
physical condition. He stated that in his opinion an 
emotional upset resulting from moving him from his 
home may increase his "bed wetting." In view of the 
testimony of Venita Kelsey and Roland Kelsey, grand-
parents of Michael with whom he lived during about 
four months immediately prior to his being placed in 
a foster home, that Michael never wet the bed while 
he lived with them, the question arises as to whether 
the emotional circumstances which caused that con-
dition were not the result of his experiences in his foster 
home. One wonders also, why the bed wetting has con-
tinued over the three-year period he was in the home 
of appellants if he was as happy and contented and 
well adjusted as their testimony indicated. 
But even if it were proved beyond question that 
appellants were in all respects suitable to have custody 
of Michael, and were able to care for him, or "even 
though they are better able to afford the child material 
advantages" than his natural parents could provide, 
the court should give custody to his natural father in 
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the absence of testimony that the natural parent is 
unfit. See 17 C.J.S. 649, Para. 12, supra. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons discussed herein, respondent prays 
that the decree of the Juvenile Court of Utah County 
be affirmed, and that Michael be returned to the home 
of his father, the respondent herein, and for costs. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Herbert B. Maw 
310 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorney for Respondent. 
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